Introduction
On 29 June 1948 the world learned with astonishment about the ªrst schism within the Communist bloc. The Soviet press that day published a resolution titled "The Situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party" that had been adopted a few days earlier at a meeting in Romania of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). The resolution accused the Communist leaders in Belgrade of "having recently pursued in domestic and foreign affairs policies that fundamentally deviate from the Marxist-Leninist line" and "thereby placed themselves and Yugoslavia outside the family of fellow Communist parties, outside the united Communist front, and consequently outside the Cominform." 1 This event was all the more surprising because Yugoslavia was generally considered Moscow's most loyal ally among the newly established "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe. The Yugoslav Communists were well-known for having pursued the establishment of socialism in their country more aggressively than their comrades elsewhere in the socialist camp. The Soviet Union seemed to have a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Yugoslavia. The Soviet leader, Josif Stalin, counted on Yugoslavia as a reliable ally that served as a model for the other people's democracies in their internal development.
Well before the archives of the former Communist bloc became accessible, the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict of 1948 had been extensively discussed in Western Cold War historiography. 2 In 1983 a prominent German historian of Articles on the topic before the roundtable also appeared in the Soviet journals Voprosy istorii (No. 7, 1988) and Novaya i noveishaya istoriya (No. 4, 1988) . Some previously unpublished correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade was made public in Vestnik MID SSSR, No. 6 (1990), pp. 53-63. The ªrst monograph based on new archival documents is Yuri S. Girenko, Stalin-Tito (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991). Although Girenko was granted access to materials from the archive of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, his book unfortunately lacks any reference to the exact location of these sources. The foremost expert on the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the conºict of 1948 is Leonid Gibianskii, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies under the Russian Academy of Science. Over the past two decades, Gibianskii has published many articles on the subject.
The notion that the conºict stemmed from the resistance of Yugoslav leaders to Soviet hegemony is correct insofar as Stalin's increasing ambition to control the socialist camp after World War II was bound to provoke tension between Moscow and individual states. From Soviet documents, however, it is not apparent that the roots of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute derive from differing ideological views concerning the development of socialism. Nor do the sources contain any indication that the basically harmonious relationship between Moscow and Belgrade was seriously at risk at any time before the end of 1947.
Instead, the documents indicate that the main reason for the conºict was Stalin's dismay when Tito continued to pursue an expansionist foreign policy agenda toward Yugoslavia's neighbors, especially Albania, against Moscow's stern advice at a time when Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole was hardening.
9 Soviet and Yugoslav interests collided once it became clear in 
The Role of Ideology: The Claim of Yugoslavia's Own Path to Socialism
Because the leaders of all Soviet-bloc countries claimed their legitimacy from ideology, conºicts among them were essentially ideological or had to be presented as such. The Cominform resolution of 28 June 1948 accused the Yugoslavs of deviating from the Marxist-Leninist line. The published letters exchanged by Soviet and Yugoslav leaders from March through May 1948- letters that were merely a prelude to the Cominform resolution in June-were entirely ideological in tone. The Soviet letters attacked the Yugoslav system and accused Yugoslav leaders of going their own way in the building of socialism rather than adhering to the Soviet model.
In response, the Yugoslavs insisted that they were not in any way deviating from the Marxist-Leninist line. Not until later, when Tito sought to bolster domestic support for his leadership and to give the Yugoslav model a new ideological justiªcation, did he embrace the argument that the split occurred because of Yugoslavia's own path toward socialism. When Tito spoke with his biographer in the summer of 1952, he put forth the new line: "When did the dispute between our country and the Soviet leadership really start? If we consider the historical course of events, it is clear that by 1941, from the very start of our revolution, elements of frictions between us and them already existed."
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It is true that Soviet-Yugoslav relations were never entirely smooth. Even during World War II, disagreements emerged between the two sides, most notably when Tito established a provisional government in Jajce on 29-30 November 1943, apparently against Stalin's will.
12 New frictions arose after the war because of Yugoslavia's policies toward its neighbors. In particular Belgrade's territorial claims on Italy's Trieste region brought Yugoslavia to the brink of war with Allied troops in early 1945 and were a frequent point of contention between Tito and Stalin, who was careful not to antagonize the Soviet Union's wartime allies. 13 Tito also embarked on a series of international initiatives without ªrst consulting Stalin. A prominent example was Tito's signature of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance on 1 August 1947 without prior notiªcation to Moscow. 14 Nonetheless, Tito's domestic and foreign policies did not seriously impair the extremely close bilateral relations that existed until only a few months before the open split. Tito waged war against the German occupying troops largely under the banner of Soviet-style Communism and Marxist-Leninist ideology.
15 Perhaps Stalin did not approve of Tito's decision to form a government in November 1943 for fear of straining relations with the United States and Great Britain (although there is no clear archival evidence to sustain this interpretation), but all evidence suggests that Tito dutifully kept Soviet leaders informed about his intentions before the decision at Jajce was taken.
By and large, the Yugoslav Communists intended to build socialism according to the Stalinist model. Yugoslavia scrupulously followed the Soviet model in establishing its economic planning organs, judicial system, state bureaucracy, health care and educational systems, and cultural and educational spheres. The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 was basically a copy of the Soviet constitution of 1936. 17 To be sure, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Kommunisticka Partija Jugoslavije-KPJ) were pragmatic enough to understand that not all aspects of the Soviet model suited Yugoslavia's particular circumstances. By the end of 1947, for example, senior KPJ ofªcials came to believe that collectivization of agriculture in Yugoslavia should follow a different, less violent path than in the Soviet Union. 18 Around the same time, party leaders also expressed doubts that Soviet educational and cultural models were the only appropriate solution for Yugoslavia. 19 Yugoslav leaders' views of how to achieve the goal of a socialist (Communist) society may at times have diverged from those of Soviet leaders, but no one in Belgrade questioned the goal itself. 20 Indeed, the Yugoslav Communists pursued the "construction of socialism" more fanatically than did their comrades in the other Eastern European states. 21 Even on agricultural policy, a point strongly criticized by the Soviet side in the letters of accusation in the 25 Sadchikov believed that these ªgures, if anything, were understated, and he concluded that Tito had a ªrm grip on power and was not threatened domestically. 26 A report prepared in August-September 1947 by the foreign policy commission of the Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist Party-which was then formally known as the All-Union Party of Communists-Bolsheviks, or VKP(b)-noted that all "reactionary and bourgeois forces" in Yugoslavia had been eliminated and that the "roots of inner and outer capitalism [in Yugoslavia] had been wiped out more thoroughly than in the other [East European] states." 27 Because Yugoslavia was the ªrst of the East European countries to establish a Communist polity, Tito regarded himself as Moscow's staunchest ally. His territorial claims on his neighbors were not meant as a challenge to the Soviet Union. On the contrary, he was acting on the basis of speciªc national considerations. The two sides initially were able to resolve all their disagreements, even over such sensitive issues as the dispute with Italy over Trieste. Stalin did not formally establish the body until after he rejected the Marshall Plan. 37 At the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov, the leader of the Soviet delegation, gave a highly publicized speech proclaiming the division of the world into two camps: the "imperialistic and anti-democratic" camp led by the United States and the "antiimperialistic and democratic" camp led by the Soviet Union. 38 This inaugural meeting signaled that the socialist camp was about to be reorganized, that Soviet control would be strengthened, and that Stalinist regimes would be imposed throughout the region.
Initially, the Yugoslavs enthusiastically supported this endeavor. Zhdanov 40 No doubt, it was only through Stalin's intervention that Zhdanov refrained from bringing up these points. 41 As a result, a largely harmonious atmosphere existed between the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations at the founding meeting of the Cominform.
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The Cominform was not originally set up to condemn Yugoslavia, as some Yugoslav writers later claimed. 43 Instead, the purpose of the organization was to tighten Soviet control over all the socialist countries, including Yugoslavia. Soviet leaders as of mid-1947 had not yet decided to crack down on Yugoslavia. The VKP(b)'s foreign policy commission had noted the KPJ's "errors" in a memorandum on Yugoslavia dated 18 March 1948 (which served as background for the letter sent by Stalin and Molotov to Yugoslav leaders on 27 March 1948) , but the commission was just as critical of the other East European parties. 44 On 5 January 1948, the commission sent two memoranda to Mikhail Suslov titled "On the Anti-Marxist Ideological Views of the Leaders of the Polish Communist Party" and "On Certain Errors of the Czechoslovak Communist Party." 45 In late March 1948, the commission completed another memorandum highlighting "errors" of the Hungarian Communist party. 46 All of these reports were issued well before the accusations against the KPJ had been prepared. From the time the Cominform was created in September 1947 until March 1948 , the gradual worsening of relations between Moscow and Belgrade was by no means unique within the socialist camp. The Soviet Union was establishing much tighter control over all the East European states.
The change in Soviet policy was a necessary but not a sufªcient condition for the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict. Stalin's decision to single out Yugoslavia was motivated largely by his displeasure with Tito's expansionist policy in the Balkans, particularly toward Albania.
Belgrade's Ambitions vis-à-vis Albania
Until recently, the role of the Balkans, particularly Albania, in the SovietYugoslav split was known mostly from Djilas's Conversations with Stalin. In 1984, a few years after Tito's death but before the archives were opened, Yugoslav historian Vladimir Dedijer included documents in the ªnal installment of his three-volume biography of Tito that conªrmed the importance of the Balkans in the Soviet-Yugoslav split. The documents showed, for example, that in mid-April 1948, Tito told the KPJ Central Committee that "the ªrst conºict [between Moscow and Belgrade] broke out on account of Albania." 47 Dedijer indicated that the sensitivity of the issue had caused Yugoslav Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj in 1953 to prohibit any further reference to this subject in Tito's ofªcial biography. 48 A key objective of Tito's policy in the Balkans was to establish Yugoslavia as the regional hegemon. This goal was evident as early as mid-1943, when the idea of forming a united headquarters of the partisan movements of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece ultimately failed because of Tito's unwillingness to agree on a structure giving each member an equal voice. Instead, he wanted the organization to be subordinated to the Yugoslav partisan headquarters. Because Tito believed that his movement was the dominant military force in the Balkans, he concluded that "we must be at the center of the Balkan countries in military as well as political respects." 49 In seeking a dominant role in the region, Yugoslavia hoped to resolve long-standing ethnic and territorial issues in its favor. Uniªcation with Albania would have eased Yugoslavia's concerns about the large ethnic Albanian minority in Kosovo. Unlike other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, the Kosovar Albanians largely refused to cooperate with Tito's Popular Front during World War II. Although the KPJ maintained close relations with the Communist resistance in Albania during the war, Tito from an early stage was unnerved by the desire of some members of the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) to seek uniªcation with Kosovo. When CPA leaders approached the KPJ in mid-1943 to discuss the prospects of Albania's postwar uniªcation with Kosovo, Tito refused to discuss the matter. 50 Instead he sought to resolve the Kosovo question by incorporating Albania into Yugoslavia. 51 A similar problem existed with regard to Macedonia, a historically contested region divided among Yugoslavia (Vardar Macedonia), Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia), and Greece (Aegean Macedonia). Tito wanted to unite all parts of Macedonia within the framework of an enlarged Yugoslav federation with both Bulgaria and Greece. 52 The southern Balkans thus presented a challenge for Moscow not only because of the ongoing civil war in Greece, but also because of ethnic and territorial disputes that could precipitate a larger conºict. Efforts to stem Yugoslav's growing inºuence in the Balkans became increasingly important at a time when Stalin sought to tighten control over the whole socialist camp. But the Yugoslavs were reluctant to forsake their ambitions toward Albania, and the issue sparked a clash between Moscow and Belgrade in early 1948. tual Assistance in July 1946 and the conclusion of bilateral economic and customs agreements four months later. These arrangements brought Albania almost fully into the Yugoslav economic system. By late 1947, roughly 1,000 Yugoslav specialists were working in Albania on economic development projects. Yugoslavia played a large role in Albania's domestic politics as well: The CPA Central Committee included a representative from the KPJ who had a formal voice in Tirana's decision-making and played a key role in the selection of members of the CPA Politburo. 54 Soviet leaders repeatedly indicated that Albania played only a marginal role in the Soviet bloc and that Moscow would not be opposed if Albania relied more heavily on Belgrade. But Stalin and his aides warned the Yugoslavs on several occasions not to hasten uniªcation, for fear of inducing Western powers to protest or even to intervene militarily in Albania. 55 In January 1945, Stalin told a Yugoslav delegation headed by Croatian Communist leader Andrija Hebrang that "the English understand only the language of violence" and that Yugoslavia should delay ratiªcation of the Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Albania in order to avoid international complications. 56 Soviet policy on the matter began to change in the latter half of 1947, when Moscow started to establish direct links with Albania. Until that time, the Soviet Union had upheld the principle that "the way from Tirana to Moscow leads through Belgrade." 57 In May 1947, for example, before Soviet ofªcials invited Enver Hoxha, the CPA First Secretary and chairman of the Albanian Council of Ministers, to Moscow, they ªrst sought consent from Yugoslav leaders. 58 The fact that no CPA representatives were invited to the Tito's goals vis-à-vis Greece were twofold. First, he hoped that by supporting the Greek Communist guerrillas, half of whom were Slavic-born Greeks (so-called Greek Macedonians), Yugoslavia could gain territory in the northern, Slavic-populated areas of (Aegean) Greece. Second, Tito regarded the war in Greece as a pretext to strengthen Yugoslavia's presence in Albania, on the grounds that Yugoslav as well as Albanian borders were threatened by
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The Tito-Stalin Split Lavrent'ev asked Tito "whether he objects to having an Albanian delegation travel to Moscow." Tito responded that he would have objected a year ago, but that "circumstances have changed" and he is in favor of the journey. provocations from "Greek Monarcho-Fascists." 62 Chuvakhin, the Soviet envoy in Albania, later recalled that Tito wanted to exploit the Greek civil war to move ahead with the annexation of Albania:
Armed provocations on the Greek borders with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia intensiªed. The situation in the Balkans could have degenerated into an international conºict. In this situation, Yugoslavia was the only friendly country through which Albania maintained contacts to the outside world. The Belgrade politicians took advantage of this to foster a closer union between the two countries, that is, literally to incorporate Albania into Yugoslavia. They [the Yugoslavs] created an artiªcial atmosphere of insecurity and fear [in Albania] and scared the Albanians by telling them they were not in a position to defend themselves against the "aggression of the Anglo-Americans and the Greek MonarchFascists." It has to be said that the Yugoslavs were quite successful at achieving their goal. 63 Not surprisingly, the increased Soviet presence in Albania aroused disquiet in Belgrade. Yugoslav leaders were especially worried about the inºux of Soviet specialists into Albania to help out with mining and oil reªning. Yugoslav ofªcials suspected that the establishment of direct Soviet-Albanian economic relations would encourage a later political reorientation of Albania. 64 These assessments were not far off the mark. Albanian leaders at the time increasingly viewed the Soviet Union as a bulwark against Yugoslav inºuence. The question of Albania's foreign policy orientation was greatly affected by a power struggle within the Albanian Politburo that revolved essentially around three people: CPA First Secretary Hoxha, Internal Affairs Minister Koçi Xoxe (who was also a CPA Secretary and deputy chairman of the Albanian Council of Ministers), and Economy and Industry Minister Naco Spiru. 65 Tensions among these ofªcials increased in November 1947 when Yugoslav leaders accused the CPA Politburo of adopting a hostile position toward Yugoslavia. These accusations were directed principally at Naco Spiru, the proponent of an anti-Belgrade line. Under the inºuence of Xoxe, Spiru's strongest opponent, Hoxha agreed to launch an investigation of Spiru. The investigation was still under way when Spiru died under mysterious circumstances. According to the ofªcial account, Spiru took his own life just a few days after the start of the proceedings. His death was politically signiªcant because he had maintained close contacts with the Soviet mission in Tirana and regularly heeded the mission's instructions. Shortly before his death he reportedly visited the mission to consult with Soviet ofªcials about his situation. Although the contacts between Belgrade and Tirana were conducted under maximum secrecy, Soviet ofªcials learned about the events on the same day. On 21 January, Ambassador Lavrent'ev informed Moscow that the proposed deployment of troops had been agreed without consulting the Soviet military advisers on the scene. 75 Although it remains unclear who passed this information on to Lavrent'ev, Soviet diplomats in Tirana received information about the planned troop movement directly from the Albanian government. 76 Soviet leaders clearly felt provoked, and their reaction was harsh, in part because this was not the only disturbing news from the Balkans in recent days. A week earlier, on 15 January 1948, the Soviet Politburo received word that Koçi Xoxe had privately indicated that a merger of the Yugoslav and Albanian armies was in the works. Xoxe also indicated that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania had already agreed to form a single army under a common command if the situation demanded it. According to Xoxe, Hoxha had approved of all these plans. 77 On 28 January, Ambassador Lavrent'ev met with Tito at Molotov's behest to ªnd out whether reports about the proposed troop deployment were accurate. Lavrent'ev handed a message from Molotov to Tito stating that the "Anglo-Saxons" regard the "movement of the Yugoslav army into Albania as an act of occupation of Albania by the Yugoslav army and an infringement of its sovereignty" and could use these circumstances as a "pretext for intervention in these affairs."
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After Spiru's death, Tito instructed the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Vlado Popovib, to approach Stalin immediately about the Albanian question. The Yugoslav ambassador met twice, on 4 and 7 December 1947, with Soviet Politburo-member Andrei Zhdanov. Popovib called Spiru a traitor who in his anti-Yugoslav activities had made use of "imperialist" methods. The Yugoslav ambassador emphasized Spiru's close cooperation with the Soviet mission in Tirana and thereby indirectly expressed his displeasure at the Soviet pres
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After receiving Tito's response, the ambassador reported back to Molotov that same day:
In Tito's opinion the Greek Monarcho-Fascists and their supporters must be made to understand that Yugoslavia will fully defend Albania. In the event that [Yugoslavia] does not make this intention demonstrably clear, the MonarchoFascists could easily occupy southern Albania because the Albanian-Greek border is basically unprotected. Tito further stated that he agrees with Moscow's view that we have to reckon with possible actions on the part of the AngloSaxons. It is not impossible that [the movement of Yugoslav troops] will create a stir in the [Western] press, but this does not concern us. Tito asked for his views to be passed on to Moscow and decided at the same time to postpone the sending of divisions to Albania for the time being. If the Soviet Union considers it desirable to abandon this project, Yugoslavia will accept this recommendation. From your conversation with comrade Lavrent'ev it is apparent that you consider it normal if Yugoslavia, which has signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the USSR, not only believes it can forgo consulting the USSR about the question of deploying its army to Albania but does not even consider it necessary at least to inform [the USSR about such matters]. . . . The Sov[iet] Gov [ernment] has purely by chance, through personal discussions between Soviet representatives and Albanian ofªcials, become aware of the Yugoslav government's decision concerning the deployment of your army to Albania. The USSR does not consider such a procedure to be normal. But if you regard it as normal, then on behalf of the Soviet government I must inform you that the USSR cannot agree to being presented with a fait accompli. It goes without saying that the USSR as an ally of Yugoslavia is not prepared to accept responsibility for the potential consequences of such conduct. 80 Lavrent'ev reported back to Moscow that after reading the missive, Tito became very uneasy. According to the ambassador, Tito conceded that it was a serious error to make the decision without consulting Moscow. Lavrent'ev said that the Yugoslav leader promised not to move the Yugoslav divisions to Albania and to consult with Moscow in advance about all such matters in the future. 81 The Soviet authorities were not content with a simple apology from Tito. On 1 February 1948 Lavrent'ev handed the Yugoslav marshal a further letter from Molotov emphasizing that serious differences exist between us with regard to questions of foreign policy. In view of the tense international situation we believe it necessary to eliminate these differences by means of an exchange of views at an unofªcial meeting in Moscow. We therefore request that you send two or three senior ofªcials of the Yugoslav government to Moscow for an exchange of views. Ofªcials of the Bulgarian government have also been invited. Time of arrival not later than 8-10 February. Inform us of your view. 82 Tito immediately accepted the invitation and sent a high-ranking Yugoslav delegation to the Soviet capital. On 8 February, in line with the timetable, Edvard Kardelj, the "second man" in the Yugoslav leadership after Tito, along with another senior Yugoslav ofªcial, Vladimir Bakarib, arrived in Moscow. Djilas was already there awaiting them and joined the Yugoslav delegation.
The Soviet "letter of invitation" indicates that a Bulgarian delegation was also summoned to Moscow. This was in response to a controversial statement by the Bulgarian Communist Party leader Georgi Dimitrov. 83 Speaking to Western journalists on 17 January 1948, Dimitrov referred to the merger of East European states and the eventual uniªcation of the "people's democracies" into a single federally organized state. He stated that "when the time is ripe [for a federation or confederation]-and it is turning ripe now-. . . our people, the people of the people's democracies, that is, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Greece (please note, Greece as well!), will solve this question." 84 Dimitrov's mention of Greece as a "people's democracy" aroused great international attention. To be sure, the ªrst negative reaction from the side of the socialist camp came not from Moscow but from Belgrade. Tito argued that Dimitrov's speech was "damaging" and asked Djilas to suggest that Stalin "have a word with the Bulgarian comrades." The Yugoslav leader wanted to emphasize that Dimitrov's position could not be equated with that of Belgrade, particularly regarding Greece. 85 The Soviet newspaper Pravda mentioned the issue on 23 January 1948 but refrained from criticizing Dimitrov. Two days later, however, Stalin sent Dimitrov a telegram describing the statement as a "rash and damaging" comment that facilitated the "struggle of the Anglo-Americans against . . . the people's democracies."
86 On 28 January, Pravda again mentioned Dimitrov's statement but this time subjected it to severe criticism. The following day, the Bulgarian government announced through its press agency that it totally accepted the Soviet position. On 2 February Dimitrov publicly disavowed his statement and wrote to Stalin assuring him of his solidarity with the Soviet position. Dimitrov's statement. 88 The turnaround in Soviet policy apparently came when Soviet leaders learned about Tito's intention to send two Yugoslav divisions to Albania. Thus, it was not Dimitrov's statement as such but the general direction of Yugoslav policy in the Balkans (and particularly the plans to send troops to Albania) that prompted the Soviet rebuke of Dimitrov. Stalin repeatedly broached the subject of the civil war in Greece. To the surprise of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders, Stalin insisted that the Greek Communists "must be helped if there is a chance of achieving victory, and if that is not the case, consideration should be given to disbanding the partisan movement." When Kardelj suggested that the Greek partisans could win, Stalin declared that the Soviet leadership "has in recent times had grave doubts about this" and "does not believe that things are developing as well in Greece as in China."
Path to
93 Both Djilas and Kardelj note in their memoirs that at the 10 February meeting, Stalin explicitly demanded an end to the Greek rebellion. 94 Stalin also was signaling to the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders that they should suspend all assistance to the Greek Communists. This was particularly relevant to Yugoslavia, which played a key role in the Greek civil war. The survival of the Greek partisans depended substantially on the scale of Yugoslav support. potential to spark a major international crisis. Soviet leaders sensed that victory for the Greek Communists could be achieved only through direct military intervention, which would risk a confrontation with the Western powers that were already preparing a formal military alliance. Stalin did not want to aggravate international tensions for a futile cause. 96 He was aware that the West regarded the Greek civil war as an indicator of Soviet expansionist plans. 97 Nonetheless, although fear of international escalation was certainly important, it was hardly the only reason for Stalin's shift on the Greek uprising. When a crisis arose in Czechoslovakia later that month, Stalin was ready to help the Czechoslovak Communists come to power with more than just diplomatic means, if necessary. 98 Similarly, when growing tensions over Berlin in the ªrst several months of 1948 escalated into a full-blown crisis in the summer, the Soviet Union came close to fomenting a confrontation with the West. 99 The documents currently available in Moscow do not fully clarify Stalin's position on the issue of Greece. Leonid Gibianskii argues that the basis for Soviet condemnation of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian initiatives was, in the ªnal analysis, [Stalin's] dissatisfaction with the independence of the actions themselves . . . although it is entirely possible that at the same time the Kremlin was genuinely apprehensive of possible Western reactions to these moves. 100 This is in line with the explanation offered by Djilas:
Not even today am I clear on Stalin's motives in condemning the uprising in Greece. Perhaps he thought that to create still another Communist stateGreece-in the Balkans, when not even the others were reliable and subservient, could hardly have been in his interest, to say nothing of possible international complications, which were becoming more and more threatening and even if they did not drag him into war, they might endanger positions he already had won. 101 Toward the end of the meeting, Stalin condemned Dimitrov's statement of 17 January but then unexpectedly proposed the creation of three smaller federations in Eastern Europe. 102 Speciªcally, he supported a union of Romania and Hungary, a union of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and a union of three Balkan states-Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. 103 As a ªrst step, Stalin ordered the immediate merger of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Only at a later date would Albania join the Balkan federation. 104 Clearly, Stalin's intention in shifting the focus to Bulgaria was to disrupt Yugoslavia's efforts to incorporate Albania. Tito was no longer as gung-ho about a union with Bulgaria as he had been right after the war. 105 The Yugoslav and Bulgarian participants were contrite during the 10 February meeting. They acknowledged having made "mistakes" and having violated procedures. The day after the meeting, Kardelj and Dimitrov signed a Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty drawn up by Moscow that committed Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to consult with the Soviet Union on all relevant international matters.
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The meeting in Moscow represented an ultimatum regarding intra-bloc procedures on foreign policy. Shortly after the Moscow meeting, on 19 February, the KPJ Politburo met secretly to discuss the Moscow talks. 107 The partic-
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The Tito-Stalin Split ipants unanimously agreed that Yugoslavia should not form a federation with Bulgaria. 108 This was the ªrst time that Tito had refused to obey a direct, unambiguous order from Moscow.
Two days later, Yugoslav leaders disregarded yet another Soviet request. Tito, Kardelj, and Djilas met with high-ranking Greek Communist ofªcials, including the General Secretary, Nikos Zakhariádes, and informed them that Stalin had spoken in favor of ending the Greek civil war. Tito, however, promised to continue to support the Greek "war of liberation" with military aid. 109 To be sure, the situation along the Yugoslav-Greek border had become acute by this point. In a discussion with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Stanoje Simib on 10 March 1948, Lavrent'ev learned that the entire Yugoslav air force had been put on a war footing. According to Simib, the Yugoslav General Command made this decision to thwart expected "military provocations from the Greek Monarcho-Fascists." 110 Shortly after speaking with Simib, Lavrent'ev approached Tito about the situation in Greece:
I asked Tito what news there was from Greece. Tito limited his answer to the statement that the Democratic Greek Army had achieved a major victory in Epirus over the forces of the Greek Monarchists. Tito said nothing to me about the matter that Simib brought up with me today-that Yugoslavia's General Command had taken appropriate measures in case of military provocation from the Greek Monarchists. 111 To Moscow's irritation, Yugoslavia also still planned to send troops to Albania. But because of the tension in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Tito wanted the Albanians to press for the dispatch of two Yugoslav divisions. At Tito's behest, the Albanians sought to persuade Moscow of the need for Yugoslav forces in Albania. Likewise, the Albanians "at their own initiative" were supposed to urge Stalin to approve of the merger of Albania and Yugoslavia. 112 The extent of Yugoslav pressure on the Albanian side during this time is evident from the text of a resolution adopted by the CPA Central Committee at a plenum on 26 February-8 March 1948. The resolution discussed Yugoslav-Albanian relations at length, focusing mostly on the internal situation and self-criticism of the party. The resolution denounced "certain elements" that together with the late Naco Spiru had spoken against a merger with Yugoslavia. The resolution also declared that a pro-Yugoslav orientation was Albania's ofªcial foreign policy line. 113 Subsequently, the Albanian authorities adopted a secret document regarding the planned "merger of the Albanian army with the Yugoslavian." The document highlighted the various components of the Albanian army that would be reorganized to facilitate a merger. The justiªcation for this move was laid out in the introductory preamble, which stressed the danger of a Greek invasion of southern Albania and claimed that the deployment of Yugoslav troops to fortify the borders was "urgently necessary."
114
At a further meeting of the KPJ Politburo on 1 March, the participants reafªrmed their position. For the ªrst time, senior Yugoslav ofªcials openly complained that Soviet leaders were taking no account of Yugoslavia's interests and were trying to impose unwise measures on Yugoslavia. The KPJ Politburo also accused Moscow of willfully torpedoing Soviet-Yugoslav economic and military-industrial cooperation and passed a resolution calling for a more independent course in these areas. 115 Stalin and his associates were kept closely apprised of the situation in Yugoslavia. The most important source of information was Sreten Zujovib, a KPJ Politburo member and minister in the Yugoslav government, who informed Soviet ofªcials about the KPJ Politburo's 1 March meeting (he did not attend the meeting on 19 February). 116 Reports from the Soviet embassy in Belgrade also contributed to the increase in Soviet-Yugoslav tension. From March 1946 (when Sadchikov was replaced by Lavrent'ev as Soviet ambassador), these reports took on an increasingly negative tone. Lavrent'ev spoke harshly about Yugoslav actions and highlighted the shortcomings of individual Yugoslav leaders. The reports frequently condemned the "national narrow-mindedness" of Yugoslav ofªcials and their insistence on downplaying the role of the Soviet Union. Why did Tito refuse to acknowledge his "errors" after the start of the Soviet ideological campaign in March 1948? Clearly, it was not in Tito's interest to provoke this kind of conºict. His claim to build socialism and rule Yugoslavia rested on a close alliance with the Soviet Union. But after the ªerce ideological confrontation began in March 1948, Tito was essentially confronted with choosing the lesser of two evils: to surrender or to resist Stalin. Tito had no illusions that "confessing" to the harsh Soviet accusations would mean only his total submission. As one of the few Yugoslav Communists in the Soviet Union who survived the Stalinist purges in the late 1930s (some 800 of his comrades were killed), he also knew that giving in not only would end his political career, but might also cost him his life. 119 Resisting the Soviet Union after the break entailed two great risks. The ªrst was the prospect of Soviet military intervention. Because Soviet military planning documents on this matter are still inaccessible, it is impossible to say for sure whether Stalin ever seriously considered a direct military invasion of Yugoslavia. 120 The documentary evidence that is available from East European and Western countries strongly suggests that, at least through late 1950, Stalin did not prepare for military intervention in Yugoslavia. What his intentions were in the ªnal two years of his life is less clear, but regardless of his precise aims, the fact is that the Yugoslavs from the outset greatly feared such a scenario. 121 As rumors of an imminent Soviet attack spread from mid-1948 on, the Yugoslav authorities tried to plan for war with the Soviet Union and its allies. 122 The second risk facing Tito was an internal move against him. He knew that his decision to resist would likely stir up considerable opposition within the KPJ, which included many true Stalinist believers. Ivo Banac suggests that up to 20 percent of party members sided with Stalin rather than Tito after the split. Tito and his colleagues responded with a massive campaign against real or imagined "Cominformists" (also called ibeovci), thousands of whom were imprisoned, killed, or forced into exile. Prominent victims included Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zujovib.
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The single most important reason for Tito to resist Stalin was, however, the nature of his power base. Of all the Communist leaders in Eastern Europe, Tito and Hoxha were the only ones who played a large role in the liberation of their countries from wartime occupation. At the end of the war, Tito's partisan guerrillas numbered roughly 200,000. Unlike other resistance movements in Yugoslavia, Tito's forces included ªghters from all the major Yugoslav nationalities. The fact that Tito came to power supported by a mass movement must have contributed to his self-conªdence and given him the sense that he could defend his position against "internal enemies" or even against an outside attack. 124 What was Stalin's larger calculus behind the condemnation of Yugoslavia? The role of the Cominform is important in this regard. Whereas the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in September 1947 was intended to speed up the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, the meeting that condemned Yugoslavia in late June 1948 was intended to demonstrate to all the Communist leaders that the rules of the game had changed. The accusations lodged against Yugoslavia signaled Stalin's new organizational program for the socialist camp. 125 Illustrative in this respect is the letter of 4 May 1948 from Stalin and Molotov to KPJ leaders afªrming the Soviet Union's right to interfere in the East European states' internal affairs. 126 Previously, the system allowed a modicum of ºexibility and left a bit of leeway for individual states, but starting in 1948 the slightest deviation was tantamount to disobedience and was therefore forbidden.
No document has yet emerged from the archives that conclusively illuminates Stalin's own role in the conºict and his personal attitude toward the KPJ. The most useful source currently available on this matter is a report sent by Stalin to the Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald on 14 July 1948, just two weeks after the Cominform meeting:
I have the impression that you [Gottwald] are counting on the defeat of Tito and his group at the next congress of the KPJ. You suggest publishing compromising material against the Yugoslav leaders. . . . We in Moscow are not counting on the early defeat of Tito and have never counted on it.
We have achieved the isolation of Yugoslavia. Hence, the gradual decline of Tito's Marxist groups is to be expected. This will require patience and the ability to wait. You seem to be lacking in patience. . . . There can be no doubt that Marxism will triumph in due course. 127 The document suggests that Stalin's primary aim was not to topple Tito but to isolate Yugoslavia. It casts doubt on Nikita Khrushchev's claim about Stalin's supposed conªdence that Tito would be quickly removed. Khrushchev in his secret speech to the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in 1956 insisted that when the conºict with Tito erupted Stalin had declared, "I will shake my little ªnger-and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."
128 Even if Stalin initially (i.e., before the Cominform resolution) believed that Tito, like other prominent East European Communists, could not withstand Soviet pressure (there are, however, no archival sources to sustain this view), the letter to Gottwald shows that Stalin clearly did not expect Tito's rapid ouster after the Cominform adopted its resolution. 129 Most likely, the statement quoted by Khrushchev is spurious.
Why was Stalin in no hurry to bring Yugoslavia under full Soviet control? Part of this has to do with his view of the Balkans after World War II. At the beginning of the war the Soviet Union regarded Yugoslavia and Greece to be outside its sphere of immediate interest. Molotov had made this clear in August 1939 when he negotiated the Nazi-Soviet pact with the Germans. 130 Soviet attitudes changed during the war when it became clear that the tide was shifting in Moscow's favor. A high-ranking Soviet Foreign Commissariat ofªcial, Ivan Maiskii, claimed in October 1943 that the whole of the Balkans had been assigned to the Soviet sphere of inºuence. 131 Later Soviet statements and documents suggest a more ºexible Soviet position. A report by Deputy Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov in February 1945 proposed seeking a compromise with the West over Yugoslavia-a view that seems to have reºected Stalin's own position. 132 The secret "percentages deal" concluded by Stalin and Winston Churchill on 9 October 1944 stipulated that each side would be given a "50-percent share" of inºuence in Yugoslavia. 133 This allocation worked decidedly in favor of the Soviet Union. The country fell under Soviet inºuence not because of any grand strategic design but because of events on the ground. The Red Army marched into Belgrade in 1944, but Tito's own forces had already freed the rest of the country by then, and the partisans reached Belgrade at basically the same time that Soviet troops did. For the USSR this situation was advantageous as long as it was controllable. But when Stalin sensed that Tito was pursuing a separate, ambitious agenda in the Balkans, he decided to get rid of the Yugoslav leadermaybe even at the risk of losing the country altogether.
Most likely, Stalin believed that what he actually gained from the conºict was, at least in the short run, worth the cost of losing Yugoslavia. Stalin's strategy to isolate Yugoslavia strengthened Moscow's grip over the rest of the socialist camp. As noted above, the Soviet Union was preparing in early 1948 to attack Communist leaders in Poland and Czechoslovakia. By orchestrating the Cominform's condemnation of the KPJ, Stalin created both a pretext and a precedent for the subsequent purges of Communist parties in the other East European countries. A series of accusations followed against high-ranking Communists, who were denounced as "Titoists." Among these were Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland, János Kádár in Hungary, and Gustáv Husák in Czechoslovakia. The many who were executed for allegedly pro-Titoist tendencies (often following show trials and "confessions") included Koçi Xoxe in Albania, László Rajk in Hungary, Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, and Rudolf Slánskü in Czechoslovakia.
The split with Belgrade also helped Moscow to achieve a number of important objectives in the Balkans. Albania turned completely away from Belgrade and found its new patron in Moscow. Bulgaria became one of the strongest critics of Tito and closest allies of Moscow. Finally, Yugoslavia ended its assistance to the Greek Communist guerrillas a few months after the Cominform resolution and thereby contributed to the defeat of the Communists in the Greek civil war.
Conclusion
The former Soviet archives have not yielded sensational new evidence that would force a complete revision of the history of the Soviet-Yugoslav split. Rather, the Soviet documents make clear which events were particularly important and how they became entangled with the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict. In particular, the new evidence permits a much more detailed understanding of the signiªcance of Yugoslavia's policy in the Balkans, showing how Tito's attempts to integrate Albania into Yugoslavia ran afoul of Stalin's Sovietization plans for Eastern Europe.
The newly available documents do not deªnitively settle the question of whether a confrontation between Tito and Stalin was inevitable. Contrary to a widespread view in the earlier literature, the latest evidence from the Russian archives does not support the thesis that the two sides were destined to clash because of differing views about the establishment of socialism. Moreover, although the hardening of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was a necessary condition for the Soviet-Yugoslav split, it was not a sufªcient condition. Not until March 1948 , when Yugoslav leaders decided that they would not accept Moscow's demands-and the Soviet Union in turn embarked on an ideologically charged attack-did a confrontation become unavoidable. Thus, the process of region-wide Sovietization and the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict did not become directly intertwined until the spring of 1948. Soviet leaders came to see the maintenance of Albanian independence as a prerequisite for limiting Yugoslavia's inºuence in the Balkans.
The declassiªcation of Soviet and East European documents has greatly illuminated previously obscure events in the complicated triangle involving Moscow, Belgrade, and Tirana. Nonetheless, important gaps in our knowledge remain. Soviet strategic thinking and policies vis-à-vis the southern Balkan region have thus far attracted relatively little attention among scholars of the Cold War. Soviet perceptions of the Greek civil war, of the federation plans among the Balkan states, and of relations with Albania have gone largely unexplored. Given the salience of Albania in the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict, a thorough scholarly analysis of Soviet policy toward this small Balkan state will be a key task for future research.
